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RACE, RELIGION, GENDER, AND INTERSTATE
FEDERALISM: SOME NOTES FROM HISTORY
By Akhil Reed Amar*
America today is a vast and far-flung empire, and some of its
deepest political divisions implicate issues of race, religion, and gender.
Superimposed on these divisions is the template of federalism, allowing
different states and regions to try to resolve these divisive political
issues differently. It was ever thus; and in a quick and broad way, I
would like to sketch out for you a few examples of earlier historical
flash points where interstate federalism met race, religion, and gender.
Begin with race. We have already heard a lot today about the idea
of one country, with free interstate ingress and egress. This idea of a
right to travel is quite prominent in Seth Kreimer's paper. I Even be-
fore we had the Constitution, we had the Articles of the Confederation;
and one of the most central features of those Articles was Article
IV-a precursor of our Constitution's own Article IV, which includes
things like the Privileges-and-Immunities and Full-Faith-and-Credit
Clauses. Under the Articles of Confederation, Article IV proclaimed
that "the free inhabitants of each of these states, paupers, vagabonds,
and fugitives from Justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges
and immunities of free citizens in the several states."
Now, today we look at this from the perspective of the twentieth
century and see the exclusions (for example, paupers), but I want you
to see the inclusion. Granted, it says "free," so slaves were excluded,
but here is what it does not say: it does not say "white." More than
200 years ago, that meant that free blacks, who were citizens of many
northern states-recall the African American patriot Crispus Attucks,
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who fell at the Boston Massacre-would have all the rights of citizen-
ship in southern states.
This did not sit particularly well with the South Carolina dele-
gation, and they proposed an exception. They basically proposed insert-
ing the word "white" between "free" and "inhabitants" because they
did not want to have to recognize the status of free blacks as citizens in
South Carolina. That proposal was rejected eight states to two, and
"white" stayed out of Article IV of the Articles of Confederation; this,
in tum, was the foundation of our own Article IV of the U.S. Constitu-
tion.2
Now I am going to fast-forward a bit. I am still talking about the
problem of free blacks in the state of South Carolina; this is a continu-
ing problem for South Carolinians. In 1820, of course, we have the
Missouri Compromise, which constrained the expansion of slavery.
North of a certain line, the territories would be free; south of that same
line, slavery could exist. But at that point the U.S. had renounced any
interest in Texas (things changed a bit later); and so southerners were
worried that they had no elbow room for the westward expansion of
slavery. At that time, they were also becoming increasingly obsessed
by a perceived internal threat. There was a paranoid reaction to the
threat of slave insurrection. In particular, in the early 1820s there was
an alleged insurrection plot-historians are not sure exactly how real it
actually was-involving Denmark Vesey in South Carolina. South
Carolinians were convinced that this was all the work of outside agita-
tors, especially free black persons coming down from the North to stir
up the slaves.3
In response, South Carolina tried to pass a law, the Negro
Seamen's Act. This Act said that when a Negro sailor came into port,
he had to stay on the ship-if he left the ship and came ashore, he was
basically clapped in irons, held in jail, and if the captain of the ship did
not redeem him when the ship left port, he would be sold down the
river into slavery.4 Now, let me remind you, these black sailors were
citizens, free citizens of northern states and free citizens of other coun-
tries like Great Britain. All this gave rise to a very important case de-
cided by Circuit Justice Johnson, who invalidated the Act.s This cause
2. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 572-85 (1857) (Curtis, J., dissent-
ing).
3. See generally WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITlmON-
ALISM IN AMERICA 1760-1848, at 126-32 (1977).
4. See id. at 132.
5. See Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 F. Cas. 493 (C.C.D.S.C. 1823) (No. 4,366). For general
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celebre led to all sorts of assertions of nullification and interposition,
with South Carolina simply refusing to be bound by federal treaties,
treaties by which the United States had pledged to Great Britain that
British citizens would be treated with dignity and respect when they
happened to come. to America. In South Carolina, Justice Johnson's
ruling was widely defied for thirty or forty years; South Carolina wor-
ried that when free blacks came to the state, they would make it diffi-
cult for South Carolina to remain a slave state. Already you see the
tensions of interstate federalism.
In the 184Os, the issue resurfaced. A Massachusetts lawyer named
Samuel Hoar journeyed down to South Carolina to represent various
free blacks subjected to this law. He traveled down with his daughter,
and he was basically run out of town on a rail. The South Carolina
legislature passed an act of attainder and banishment; they gave him a
few hours to leave the state. Naturally, he high-tailed it out of there.6
That major interstate encounter was one of the most notorious events of
the day and was discussed over and over and over again in the legisla-
tive debates concerning the Fourteenth Amendment.7 It was the back-
drop against which the Fourteenth Amendment and its Privileges-or-
Immunities Clause-which has some language very similar to the Privi-
leges-and-Immunities Clause of Article IV-was drafted.s
So much for free blacks. What about allegedly unfree blacks?
What do you do when a person who is in the North and who claims to
be free is alleged by some white man to be a runaway slave? That was
the problem in the 1842 case of Prigg v. Pennsylvania.9 The real prob-
lem was, once again, an interstate federalism issue: black people in the
North were presumed free, and the burden of proof was on someone
else to prove otherwise, but in the South, blacks were presumed slaves.
So what happened when a slave catcher unilaterally went up into (the
free state of) Pennsylvania, grabbed some guy, said, "You are my
slave," and then tried to yank him across the state line to (the slave
state of) Maryland? Pennsylvania thought this was kidnapping. "If he is
your slave, come into our courts and prove it. If so, under the Fugitive
Slave Clause, alas, we may be obliged to render the slave. But, you
discussion and analysis of the case and its aftennath, see w. WIECEK, supra note 3, at 133-39; 2
CHARLEs WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 84-87 (1922).
6. For details, see W. WIECEK, supra note 3, at 140; Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill ofRights
and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALIl LJ. 1193, 1277 (1992).
7. See Amar, supra note 6, at 1277 n. 357.
8. See id. at 1229-30.
9. 41 U.S. (16 PeL) 539 (1842).
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have to prove that he is indeed a slave."
You can now see how the original constitutional solution of leav-
ing race relations and slavery up to local option is starting to erode.
South Carolina could not quite live with free law to the North, because,
through sailors and the like, free law was being exported by dark-
skinned folks; Pennsylvania, conversely, could not quite live with slave
laws below it, because these laws were threatening to turn all free
black Pennsylvanians into kidnap bait.
This problem arose again in the l850s with great drama in the
Dred Scott case, which once again posed the familiar problem of what
to do when free law met slave law in a country that was divided geo-
graphically. Chief Justice Taney proclaimed that Congress had to en-
force slavery in the territories. When a slave master voluntarily took a
slave with him-now we are talking not about runaway slave, but
about a slave master voluntarily taking his slave to free federal territo-
ry~ongress was obliged to enforce his mastery. To not enforce the
slavery, the servitude, Chief Justice Taney said, was to violate due
process of law.!O The only thing standing between Dred Scott's logic
and the utter nationalization of slavery-so that Dred Scott's master
could take him into Massachusetts, into Pennsylvania, into New York,
into Connecticut and live there forever-was a technical case called
Barron v. Baltimore:! That case said that, technically, the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause does not apply to state governments,
but applies only to the federal government. However, every time a free
state refused to enforce the servitude, under Taney's theory, it was
violating due process.
Now, consider Lemmon v. People/2 a case pending before the
United States Supreme Court in 1861, when the Civil War broke out.
In Lemmon, a master wanted to take a slave from one slave state to
another, and he took a somewhat circuitous route, stopping off in New
York City. He was going by ship, and in those days the best way to get
from one southern port to another southern port was often through the
entrepot of New York City. He took his slave with him, and then he
alit from the ship, and he wanted to keep the slave with him in the
hotel while they were waiting for the new ship to come in. But, New
10. DIed Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 450 (1857).
11. 32 U.S. (7 PeL) 243 (1833).
12. 20 N.Y. 562 (1800). For general discussion, see 2 C. WARREN, supra note 5, at 82-83.
See also Kreimer, supra note 1; Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage and Public Policy: The
Miscegenation Precedents, 16 QUINNIPIAcL REv. 105 (1996).
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York said, in effect, "We do not want to enforce slavery here in New
York. We are a free state." And so New York courts issued a writ of
habeas corpus and ordered the release of this slave. The response was,
"You can not do that. When people are involved in interstate transit
and interstate commerce, it is the obligation of even a free state to
enforce servitude." So again you can see in these race cases, the prob-
lems of this geographic house divided. In the short run, it seemed like
a good solution to let each state choose for itself. But in the long run,
because people move and we are one nation, the solution starts to
break down.
Let us next consider religion, and here I will be somewhat shorter.
Today, we think the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment
reflects a national commitment against established churches. In fact,
that is not quite so. If you look carefully at the clause, it says: "Con-
gress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion." In the
1780s, this was nothing more than a local option amendment. It basi-
cally said that each state should decide whether to have an·established
church or not. Congress would not create a national established church,
but neither would it disestablish any existing state churches; it would
pass no law respecting (i.e., concerning) the establishment of reli':
gion--no law one way or the other.13 Most of the New England states
already had established state churches at the Founding and the First
Amendment said that Congress could not interfere with state establish-
ment (or non-establishment) policies. It was the American equivalent of
the Peace of Augsburg of 1555, or the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648,
where religious warfare in Europe was resolved by allowing the reli-
gion of the local prince to determine the religion of the principality.
There would be no imperial policy on religion; it would be left to local
option. That was the original First Amendment vision-each state
would decide for itself.
That system started to break down over time. Consider the territo-
ries. There, Congress had to decide one way or the other: was there to
be government-sponsored religion in the territories or not? And here,
the Establishment Clause started to take on an anti-establishment rather
than simply agnostic hue.
Of course, with the territorial expansion westward in the nine-
teenth century, one of the big issues concerned polygamy and the Mor-
13. See generally Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE LJ.
1131, 1157-60 (1991); Akhil Reed Amar, Some Notes on the Establishment Clause, 2 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 1 (1996).
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mon movement. In 1856, the Republican Party condemned slavery and
polygamy as twin relics of barbarism.14 That is partly because Republi-
cans were anti-Mormon, but also because they believed that slavery
itself was a form of polygamy, giving southern white slave masters
access to black women as concubines and mistresses. IS So, the great
party of freedom at the time, the Republican Party, was dead set
against polygamy in the slaveholding South and in the Mormon West.
Utah was essentially not allowed to become a state until the Mormon
Church renounced even the idea of polygamy; as late as 1890, there"
was a statute on the books making it a crime merely to advocate polyg-
amy. If you did, you would be disenfranchised. And this statute was
upheld by the United States Supreme Court in the case of Davis v.
Beeson:6 Now, you might say, "Who cares about that? That was in
1890." But I should remind you that Davis was cited just this year by
Justice Scalia in Romer v. Evans. l ?
Having discussed a few interstate issues implicating race and
religion, let me conclude with just a few observations about gender.
The word "male" gets put into the Constitution for the very ftrst time
in Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Here is the problem. After
the Civil War, all the blacks were freed. It used to be the case that a
southern (unfree) black only counted as three-ftfths of a person when it
came to national apportionment. After the Thirteenth Amendment,
however, all those newly freed blacks counted one for one. When the
confederate states sought to come back to Congress after the Civil War,
they were going to claim more representation than they had had before.
This seemed odd; they were not letting black people vote. So, you
might think, "Okay, change the rule of representation. Instead of basing
representation in Congress on a state's overall population, let us base
the number of seats in Congress on the number of people who are
actually allowed to vote." That seems like a sound theory. If southern-
ers let blacks vote, then they could count them in the representation
and apportionment base; but if they did not, they could not. The prob-
lem with that idea was that it would skew the balance among the north-
ern states, because there were very few women in California but lots in
Massachusetts. To solve this problem, Congress came up with compli-
14. 1 NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS 1840-1956, at 27 (Donald B. Johnson & Kirk H. Porter,
eds., 1973).
15. See generally Akhil Reed Amar and Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery: A Thir-
teenth Amendment Response to DeS1umey, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1359, 1366-68 (1992).
16. 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
17. 116 S. Ct 1620, 1635-36 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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cated wording in Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which fIrst
puts the word "male" in the Constitution.
Fast-forward thirty years and we begin to see states individually
giving women the vote. Utah was one of the fIrst, along with Wyoming
and Colorado and Idaho. Now, go back to the Fourteenth Amendment.
If you had apportionment based on the number of people who voted,
any state that-heaven forbid-let women vote would automatically
double its representation in Congress. That, thought the men of the
Thirty-Ninth Congress, would create perverse incentive: If you let
women vote, you would automatically double your state's clout in the
House of Representatives. If we had had direct election for the Presi-
dency, any state that let its women vote would have doubled its impact
in Presidential elections, too. However, we h~d-and still have-the
Electoral College System, which basically says, "No matter how few or
how many people a state lets vote, it still has the same number of
electoral votes." But, something else did happen. State by state, women
got the vote, in California, in Oregon, in New York, and elsewhere; at
a certain point-and this connects with Evan's observation about con-
testirig the map of Americal8-when there were enough states that let
women vote, anyone who wanted to be President had to be for
women's suffrage. If you were not in favor of women's suffrage, you
could kiss those states' electoral college votes goodbye. Lots of sena-
tors at the time wanted to be President. (Some things do not change.)
That is how we got the Nineteenth Amendment fIrst, state by state,
and then, once enough of that map has been contested, we reached a
tipping point.19
Let me conclude with the following observation on race, on reli-
gion, on gender: the initial strategy was often for the federal govern-
ment to be neutral or agnostic, to leave certain things to local option.
Those strategies worked for a while. But, in the long run, on the race
question this country could not exist half slave and half free. In the
long run, because of the territories, we had to decide whether the First
Amendment was simply agnostic on the issue of establishment or was
truly committed to an affmnative anti-establishment principle. And on
gender, the initial strategy of local option, of course, gave way to the
Nineteenth Amendment and a national vision of equality.
18. Evan Wolfson, The Freedom to Marry: Our Struggles for the Map of the Country, 16
QUINNIPIAC L. REv. 209 (1996).
19. See AILEEN s. KRADrroR, nm IDEAS OF TIlE WOMAN SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT 1890-
1920, at 192 (1971).
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I suggest that the long-tenn lesson then of all this is a hopeful one
for Evan and his colleagues. They start state by state, but in the long
run20 the nation probably cannot exist half slave and half free on this
question.
20. Of course, the long run can be long indeed.
